Exploitation and the Decision to Migrate: The Role of Abuse and Unfavorable Working Conditions in Filipina Domestic Workers’ Desire to Return Abroad by Naufal, George & Malit, Froilan, Jr.
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
Working Papers ILR Collection 
8-23-2018 
Exploitation and the Decision to Migrate: The Role of Abuse and 
Unfavorable Working Conditions in Filipina Domestic Workers’ 
Desire to Return Abroad 
George Naufal 
Texas A & M University 
Froilan Malit Jr. 
Gulf Labour Markets and Migration and Population Programme 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/workingpapers 
 Part of the International and Comparative Labor Relations Commons, Labor Economics Commons, 
and the Migration Studies Commons 
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR. 
Support this valuable resource today! 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the ILR Collection at DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Working Papers by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. For more 
information, please contact catherwood-dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
Exploitation and the Decision to Migrate: The Role of Abuse and Unfavorable 
Working Conditions in Filipina Domestic Workers’ Desire to Return Abroad 
Abstract 
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries host at least 2.4 million foreign domestic workers, who are 
legally excluded from national labor laws and regulations, thus placing them in precarious social, legal, 
and economic conditions in the GCC labor markets. Despite the recent growth of academic scholarship 
on domestic work in the GCC and beyond, little attention has been paid to absconding foreign domestic 
workers and the complex role abuse plays in determining their future decision to migrate. This paper 
examines the likelihood that Filipina domestic workers will migrate after absconding from their previous 
employer. Applying a unique dataset of absconding Filipina domestic workers collected at the Philippine 
Labor Office (POLO) in Qatar between 2013 - 2015, we find that abuse and poor working conditions do not 
act as deterrents for future migration. Paradoxically, absconding domestic workers who have been 
financially abused are more likely to want to return and seek employment abroad. This study offers 
empirical and theoretical insights into the connection between migrant exploitation and domestic 
workers' desire to migrate once again. 
Keywords 
migration, absconding, domestic workers, GCC countries, abuse, mobility 
Disciplines 
International and Comparative Labor Relations | Labor Economics | Labor Relations | Migration Studies 
Comments 
Required Publisher Statement 
Copyright held by the authors. 
Suggested Citation 
Naufal, G., & Malit, Jr., F. (2018). Exploitation and the decision to migrate: The role of abuse and 
unfavorable working conditions in Filipina domestic workers’ desire to return abroad. Retrieved [insert 
date], from Cornell University, ILR School site: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/workingpapers/185 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/workingpapers/185 
1 
Exploitation and the Decision to Migrate: The Role of Abuse and Unfavorable 




Public Policy Research Institute  
Texas A&M University and IZA 
Email: gnaufal@tamu.edu  
Froilan Malit, Jr.  
Gulf Labour Markets and Migration and 
Population Programme 
Email: ftm22@cornell.edu  
 
 
August 23, 2018 
 
Abstract 
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries host at least 2.4 million foreign domestic 
workers, who are legally excluded from national labor laws and regulations, thus placing them in 
precarious social, legal, and economic conditions in the GCC labor markets. Despite the recent 
growth of academic scholarship on domestic work in the GCC and beyond, little attention has 
been paid to absconding foreign domestic workers and the complex role abuse plays in 
determining their future decision to migrate. This paper examines the likelihood that Filipina 
domestic workers will migrate after absconding from their previous employer. Applying a 
unique dataset of absconding Filipina domestic workers collected at the Philippine Labor Office 
(POLO) in Qatar between 2013 - 2015, we find that abuse and poor working conditions do not 
act as deterrents for future migration. Paradoxically, absconding domestic workers who have 
been financially abused are more likely to want to return and seek employment abroad. This 
study offers empirical and theoretical insights into the connection between migrant exploitation 
and domestic workers' desire to migrate once again. 
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Contemporary scholarship on domestic work has grown in recent decades, examining the 
transnational lives and conditions of foreign domestic workers operating in a dynamic, 
globalized world (Hochschild, 2000; Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2002; Anderson, 2000; Parennas, 2001; 
Gamburd, 2000; and Abu-Habib, 2008; Fernandez and de Regt, 2014; Jureidini, 2017; Paul, 
2017).  In the context of the Gulf countries, researchers examine the domestic work sector 
through the Kafala sponsorship system in the context of labor exploitations and human rights 
(Jureidini, 2004; Najjar, 2002; Sabban, 2002; Shah, 2002, 2004; Fernandez, 2014), human 
trafficking (Parennas and Silvey, 2016; Mahdavi, 2014; Vlieger, 2012), slavery (Halabi, 2008), 
conflicts and power asymmetry (Vlieger, 2011; Malit and Naufal, 2016). Other researchers have 
emphasized the role of transnational recruitment practices, which often reinforce ongoing legal 
vulnerabilities and exploitations in the labor market (Agunias, 2012; Jureidini, 2016). While 
current literature provides insight into the complex and structural vulnerabilities of live-in 
foreign domestic workers in the Gulf countries and beyond, further empirical investigation is 
necessary to explore the transnational lives and conditions of absconding foreign domestic 
workers in the Gulf countries.1  Though many scholars have already provided insight as to why 
foreign domestic workers migrate to the Gulf countries — often through qualitative studies 
(Anbesse et al, 2009; Fernandez, 2010; Mildner and Matsuda, 2013; Malit and Naufal, 2016) — 
they have largely ignored the unique and complex lives of absconding foreign domestic workers, 
                                                 
1 Absconding domestic workers are considered illegal domestic workers who breach the labor and employment 
contracts with their sponsors by running away from their employers’ workplace facility (i.e. home/villa).  These 
absconding domestic workers are different from the regular live-in domestic workers because they have an invalid 
immigration status or have ongoing labor/immigration cases filed against them by their employer. Therefore, 
absconding domestic workers are not only legally vulnerable but also are criminalized in the GCC countries.  
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and no empirical studies have interrogated the complex relationship between migrant 
exploitation and future migration decisions.     
In this paper, we apply a unique data set of absconding Filipina domestic workers 
collected at the Philippine Labor Office (POLO) in Qatar between 2013-2015 to examine the role 
abuse (i.e. financial, physical, social, psychological etc.) plays in domestic workers' future 
migration decision. This particular study is relevant for various empirical and theoretical reasons. 
First, among the nearly 25 million migrants in the GCC labor market, absconding domestic 
workers comprise the most hidden and legally vulnerable population due to their immigration 
status.  Absconding domestic workers who are illegally employed are particularly vulnerable to 
the abuse of their employer. For example, employers who hire absconding domestic workers are 
able to limit or eliminate the day off of their employees or prohibit their phone usage. 
Absconding domestic workers are also often forced to work numerous hours with limited social 
interaction, and, because they are not part of formal employment, they lack clear job 
descriptions, paystubs, and work records2 (Shah et al, 2002; International Labour Organization 
(ILO), 2013). Because of their immigration status, absconding workers are also often confined to 
their employer’s household as they are heavily monitored by local police and immigration 
authorities. Thus, it is difficult to collect data on absconding domestic workers because they fear 
exposing their identities and risking potential deportation. They are also often restricted by 
governments for national security purposes.3  
                                                 
2 It is not uncommon to find multiple domestic workers within the same household. Often those workers are related 
(a mother and her daughter; sisters or even cousins). If not related, workers are actually wary of each other and 
prefer to limit daily interaction. 
3 In Qatar, the vast majority of Filipina domestic workers do not have a reported day off from their sponsor, thus 
preventing them from interacting in public spaces. There are some cases, however, where Filipina domestic workers 
obtain a day-off from their employers, and they typically can be seen in Catholic churches, malls, Filipino-
dominated supermarkets and other public spaces where most Filipinos collectively spend their time in Qatar. 
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Second, foreign domestic workers (specifically absconding populations) often face 
institutional, regulatory, and policy exclusions from the receiving state’s governing labor laws 
and services (Shah 2002, 2004; Fernandez, 2014; Malit, Jr. and Ghafoor, 2014). 4   Unlike 
workers in the private sector, foreign domestic workers find it difficult to access legal mediation, 
dispute or conciliation services available within the host country government services because 
they are excluded from the national labor laws.  Alternatively, foreign domestic workers often 
rely on their sending governments’ services, such as their labor mediation processes or pro bono 
legal services, which help them claim some labor rights in the host country.  
Absconding migrants have three choices when they leave their employers.  They can stay 
in the GCC country undetected, working and living illegally; they can report to local law 
enforcement; or find temporary refuge in the worker’s embassy or consulate.  No matter which 
path they choose, however, absconding domestic workers in the GCC countries are categorized 
as illegal migrants and are subjected to fines, jail time, and immediate deportation, further 
contributing to their precarious social, economic, and legal status in the GCC. 
This paper's contributions to migration literature are twofold. First, the case study adds 
academic rigor to previous scholarship on domestic work in the Gulf countries by providing 
empirical evidence from the largest sample size ever collected on absconding domestic workers 
in Qatar. Second, the study appears to be the first case study that examines the relationship 
between migrant exploitation and future migration in the context of the GCC domestic work 
sector. Therefore, the study has the potential to provide a more complete picture of the complex 
roles and implications of abuse on migrants’ willingness to migrate again. These empirical 
findings are important for both scholars and policymakers as they attempt to address the many 
                                                 
4 Though there are no specific statistics on domestic workers in the Gulf region, news sources estimate the number 
of domestic workers to be at least 3 million in the GCC region. 
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consequences of migrant exploitation and future migration decision-making logic. The study is 
divided into four sections.  The first section explores the concept of contract servitude and the 
Kafala Sponsorship System, situating the case of Filipina absconding domestic workers in Qatar.  
The second section highlights the migration context in Qatar and the field challenges 
encountered when conducting data collection on absconding domestic workers. Next, we present 
data, analysis and results. The concluding section offers empirical, theoretical and policy 
implications on the existing migration literature.  
 
Theorizing Contract Servitude and the Kafala Sponsorship System   
 
In the GCC countries, the Kafala Sponsorship System is a government policy which regulates, 
manages, and monitors the employment, residency, and mobility of migrant populations in the 
domestic labor market (Gardner, 2010).  Bales (1999) argues that the concept of contract 
servitude is fundamentally based on “the complete control of a person, for economic 
exploitation, by violence, or the threat of violence.” These forms of control—as executed 
through legal, institutional, and administrative means—play a critical role in the daily power 
struggles and vulnerabilities migrant workers face in the global economy. Jureidini and 
Moukarbel (2004) further add that contract servitude is “where contracts are ‘legal fictions’ 
rather than legally binding employment agreements, and thus conceal what are in reality 
conditions of servitude.” Parallel to Bales’ theoretical notion of contract servitude, Miller (2006) 
expounds that “desperation is seen as a primary factor in leading people to be tricked or forced 
into servitude,” and therefore it becomes a source of power for employers to control the domestic 
worker either through violence or threat in order to achieve his/her economic objectives. Thus, 
domestic workers become legally vulnerable as employers essentially "own" them—specifically 
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through contractual agreement—legitimized through “control and the use of violence to sustain 
control” (Bales 1999; Jureidini and Moukarbel 2004). 
Bale's (1999) theoretical framework on contract servitude illuminates the problematic 
nature of the Kafala Sponsorship System in GCC countries and other countries in the Middle 
East and the North Africa (MENA) region (Jureidini 2003, 2004; Jureidini and Mourkabel 2004). 
The restrictive conditions embedded in the Kafala Sponsorship System, combined with the 
prevailing power asymmetry between employers and migrants that often lead to violence (or the 
threat of violence), have become the foundation for contract servitude. In a cross-national 
comparison of Sri Lankan domestic workers’ experiences (before their departure and after they 
return to Sri Lanka), Munira (1999) concludes that “contractual bondage often leads to 
exploitation” because employers and agents often violate contractual terms and obligations 
offered to workers, while the labor rights (i.e. working conditions, minimum wage, ability to 
switch jobs) of domestic workers were often restricted or absent.. Though these conclusions 
come from one particular case study, other research indicates that foreign domestic workers’ in 
the GCC countries, including the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, and Qatar 
experience similar worker oppression (Sabban 2001; Mowbray 2003; Sherry 2004; 
Wickramesekara, 2004; Degorge 2006; US State Department 2007; Halabi 2009). The Kafala 
system combined with the exclusion from the governing labor laws, particularly on mediation, 
arbitration and conciliation services, deepen domestic workers' precarious status in the domestic 
market.  
Contractual bondage has the strongest potential to exploit foreign migrant workers and 
empower employers through the use of legal and administrative methods: passport confiscation, 
contract substitution, and the denial of fundamental labor and human rights. In a fieldwork 
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assessment in the GCC countries, Gardner (2014) examines the normalization of passport 
confiscation in Qatar and its prevalence among migrant domestic workers. The confiscation of 
legal documents is intended to control the mobility rights of domestic workers; however, it also 
has the secondary consequence of facilitating the loss of workers' identity and status. This 
administrative control is consistent with Bales's (1999) conception of contract servitude, and it 
highlights how the sponsor or employer (acting through the agency of an owner-holder) violates 
host countries' laws that restrict the mobility and labor rights of foreign migrant workers, while 
sustaining long-term exploitation. 
Existing scholarship clearly identifies foreign domestic workers’ vulnerabilities, legal and 
cultural exclusion in host countries, and the impact of labor rights exclusions on the well-being 
of migrant domestic workers (Chammartin 2004; Human Rights Watch 2010; ILO 2013).  It also 
examines the brokers/agents role in sustaining exploitation (Shah 2004; Jureidni 2003, 2014; 
Fernandez 2011, 2014). Although Bales's (1999) notion of contract servitude has been linked 
with the GCC countries’ Kafala system, academic scholarship has paid attention to why foreign 
domestic workers continue to return to the GCC region. With the rise of social media and the 
declining cost of communication, migrants all over the world have continued to strengthen their 
connections with families and friends in their countries of origin and pass on information about 
working conditions in the host country. Current literature has examined only small samples of 
ethnographic accounts of absconding domestic workers abuse, making it difficult to draw 
inferences. By analyzing a large sample of absconding Filipina domestic workers in Qatar, this 
paper fills an important empirical gap, providing insights about the empirical determinants of 
domestic work migration in the GCC and other destination countries. 
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Research Context and Data Constraints in Analyzing Absconding Filipina Domestic 
Workers in Qatar and other GCC countries 
 
Since gaining independence in 1971, Qatar has become a key migrant destination – especially for 
overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) – in the GCC and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
region (Philippine Overseas Employment Agency 2016). Of the 2.4 million foreign migrants in 
2015, OFWs in Qatar totaled more than 200,000 representing nearly 10% of the total Qatar 
migrant population, excluding tourists and undocumented migrants. In 2015, the Philippine 
Overseas Labor Office (POLO) reported the number of legal Filipina domestic workers to be 
above 30,000, representing 18% of the total OFW population in Qatar. Private sector workers 
comprised the vast majority of OFWs: 13% professionals, 50% skilled workers, 17% semi-
skilled workers, and 2% low-skilled workers.5 Thus, Filipina domestic workers represent one of 
the largest migrant populations not only among OFW populations but also in the overall labor 
market in Qatar, the GCC and the MENA Region. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1: ABOUT HERE] 
 
As the number of absconding Filipina domestic workers continues to increase, they have become a 
critical policy concern, posing both regulatory and political challenges for the Philippine and 
Qatari governments. Between 2010 and 2015, 9,059 absconding Filipina domestic workers ran 
away from their local employers/sponsors and reported to the Philippine embassy/POLO office 
in Doha, Qatar, constituting a large share of absconding Filipina domestic work population in the 
GCC. Between 2011 and 2013, absconding Filipina domestic workers in Qatar represented 
                                                 
5 These skill breakdowns represent all OFWs working in the fields of construction, retail, administration, medical 
and engineering related fields.    
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19.43% of the total number of absconding Filipina workers in the GCC region alone.6 From the 
perspective of the GCC and MENA, the significance of the absconding domestic work 
population is even more critically relevant. As Figure 1 highlights, between 2010 and 2013, 
GCC-based absconding Filipina domestic workers represented an average of 74.5% of the total 
absconding Filipina domestic workers globally, while on a MENA-based calculation scale, 
90.75% of MENA-based absconding Filipina domestic workers were reported.  Therefore, the 
study of the absconding Filipina domestic worker population in Qatar and the MENA region is 
significant and offers newer empirical perspectives on the motivations and future migration 
decisions of absconding migrant domestic workers. 
 
Data and Analysis  
 
This paper uses a unique data set that was collected between June and August in 2013 from the 
POLO Office in Doha, Qatar. The original data set includes a total of 303 absconding Filipina 
domestic workers who took refuge in the POLO Office in Doha for a variety of reasons. The 
survey includes questions on demographics, work experience, reasons for running away from 
their last employer, and future migration plans.7 The authors conducted the data collection with 
face-to-face interviews (mostly in Tagalog) with domestic workers. Each domestic worker was 
asked to complete a hard copy of the survey and was also given a blue book to write down 
personal narratives of their work experience and decisions to leave their employer’s household. 
One of the authors was present during the entire data collection process and was able to answer 
                                                 
6 Due to lack of government data collection and transparency, we were only able to obtain data on absconding OFW 
populations between 2010 and 2015 for Qatar, and 2010-2013 for other GCC and MENA countries.  
7 Absconding and illegal workers in Qatar are deported back to their countries and are often banned from re-
entering. It is unclear whether this ban is permanent or temporary (a one year ban) and whether it also applies to 
other GCC countries. From our findings, none of the absconding domestic workers we sampled were aware of this 
potential ban, hence their response about future migration plans is unrestricted.  
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questions. This paper presents the findings from the quantitative section of the survey with 
additional insights from the qualitative blue book discussion. The findings in this paper are 
specific to the sample group that was interviewed between June and August of 2013, which is 
not necessarily representative of the Filipina domestic worker population in Qatar, the Gulf, or 
even domestic workers in the region as a whole. Furthermore, during the course of the data 
collection, the holy month of Ramadan occurred between July 8th and August 7th of 2013. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the absconding rate of domestic workers is even higher during 
Ramadan because of the extra work given to domestic workers during the month. That said, the 
results in this paper offer new insights about the composition of Filipina domestic workers in 
Doha and also on migration determinants for absconding domestic workers. 
Our paper begins with descriptive statistics to familiarize our readers with the data set. 
Table 1 presents a summary of demographics from the sample. All of the people interviewed 
were female domestic workers. One observation was dropped because of an age outlier of 63, 
leaving us with 302 observations and the oldest worker being 50 years old. The average worker's 
age is around 32 and the youngest domestic worker is 20 years old. Most workers (66.9 percent) 
have a high school degree with a quarter of them having obtained some college education. The 
sample is divided fairly evenly between single women (38.4 percent), married women (31.8 
percent) and separated women (29.8 percent). Around 76.8 percent of the women have at least 
one child and 33.8 percent have more than two children in the Philippines. More than half of the 
domestic workers in the sample have previous work experience abroad; on average, they have 
worked 26.4 months of work experience abroad before moving to Qatar. The mean monthly 
salary is 238.4 USD with a high of 467.0 and a low of 137.4 USD. Although not reported in 
Table 1, the median monthly salary in the sample is 233.5 USD. Both the mean and median 
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monthly salaries are significantly below the 400 USD minimum salary, which is legally 
mandated by the Philippines government for Filipina domestic workers in the Gulf (Doha News 
Team, 2012).8 In our sample, only 5 out of the 302 absconding domestic workers earned more 
than the 400 USD threshold.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Table 2 illustrates previous work experience in more detail. For instance, only 10.6 
percent have worked in multiple countries before moving to the GCC region. Around 31.8 
percent of the sample has worked in the GCC region before, while 16.2 percent has no GCC 
experience before moving to Qatar (their main destinations includes Asian countries, such as 
Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia). Domestic workers who have previously worked in the 
GCC have direct personal experience with, and of knowledge of the Kafala system, which could 
play a fundamental role in their future decision to return to the GCC for employment purposes. 
__________________________________________ 
Table 3 depicts the demographics of the employer and/or sponsor.  We further assume 
that the employer is also the sponsor and therefore interchangeably use both terms throughout the 
paper. The large majority of employers are Arabs (92.0 percent), of which Qatari families 
constitute 64.9 percent. Around 24.8 percent of the employers are females. These figures should 
be interpreted with caution since domestic workers might assume that the actual employer is the 
person with whom they interact on a daily basis.  In addition, more than 62.6 percent of domestic 
workers reported the education level of their sponsor, which indicates a proxy for some level of 
                                                 
8 Interestingly, labor agencies suggest that in 2012 Filipina domestic workers earned on average 247 USD a month, a 
value almost identical to our sample (Doha News Team, 2012).  
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communication between the employer and the domestic worker. On average, employers have 
three children, and, as expected, a large majority (79.1 percent) of households in the sample 
include more than one child.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Table 4 summarizes the domestic workers' main reasons for migrating to Qatar. The vast 
majority of domestic workers migrated to support families back home (77.2 percent) while 
almost one third are working to pay debt. Some (16.0 percent) have moved away to avoid family 
problems and others (11.9 percent) moved because they perceive working in Doha as a means to 
increase their long-term professional training. Reported migration reasons are not mutually 
exclusive; most of the workers in the sample have moved away not only to support family but 
also to pay debt from recruitment or placement fees, most likely incurred during the migration 
process. None of these reasons are specific to Qatar and therefore likely apply to any other labor 
migrant destination, particularly in the GCC context. Nearly all domestic workers in the sample 
migrated to Doha on an employment visa through a labor manpower agency (95.7 percent); the 
remaining migrants either entered Qatar on a tourist/visit visa or were directly hired by their 
sponsor. This migration outcome is expected since securing a visit visa to Qatar (or any GCC 
country) can be extremely difficult and requires income-based sponsorship from someone 
earning a monthly income above a certain threshold. On average, the cost of the visa is 266.5 
USD, which is slightly above the average monthly salary in our sample.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The main objective of the paper is to examine the likelihood that a migrant will want to 
return abroad for work after absconding from their employer and reporting abuse by them.  The 
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first four tables summarize the characteristics of absconding domestic workers in Qatar. To 
better understand the sample and their reasons for absconding, we look at the working conditions 
of their previous employer (Table 5). Almost 90 percent (89.1 percent) of the absconding 
domestic workers surrendered their passport to their employer, which is consistent with various 
international media and rights-based reports. This is a common practice in the GCC region where 
employers often retain domestic workers’ passports (Auwal, 2010). Less than 3 percent of the 
sample migrants reported having a weekly day off.  Domestic workers are regularly expected to 
work seven days a week with a daily average of 17.3 work hours per day. Some absconding 
domestic workers in our sample reported working around the clock, particularly during special 
holidays like Ramadan or special events such as the birth of a child. The next table examines the 
reasons for absconding.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
During field data collection, absconding domestic workers were asked about the reasons 
why they decided to leave their most recent employer. Table 6 places the recorded reasons into 
four main categories: financial abuse, physical abuse, working conditions and other reasons. The 
financial abuse category includes non-payment, salary deduction and salary underpayment (from 
initial contract agreement). The physical abuse group encompasses maltreatment, rape (or 
attempted rape) and sexual harassment. Working conditions include lack of food, working long 
hours, job or contract substitution (their job was different from the provided description). Finally, 
the data reveal that domestic workers also abscond due to other reasons: transfer of employer, 
end of contract, promise of a higher salary at another employment opportunity, and other 
personal reasons (such as pregnancy). Table 6 shows the percentages of absconding domestic 
workers who have listed one of the four main reasons to leave their last employer, hence the 
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percentages do not add up to one. Form the data, we conclude that poor working conditions are 
present in 77.8% of the workers' reasons to abscond while leaving for other reasons appears the 
least often. 
In Table 7, we disaggregate the findings in Table 6 to identify single and varied 
combinations of reasons for absconding. The majority of our sample (77.4 percent) lists more 
than one reason (Table 7) that influenced their decision to abscond, and among the most 
prevalent combinations includes financial reasons and physical and working conditions. More 
than 22.2 percent of the sample listed these reasons together. Other combinations include 
financial and working condition (12.3 percent), physical and working conditions (10.3 percent) 
and just one reason as other (10.6 percent). In general, domestic workers mainly leave due to 
multiple reasons (33.0 and 36.1 for two and three reasons) and not just one particular reason 
(22.6 percent). Most importantly, however, only 10.6 percent of absconding domestic workers 
left for reasons unrelated to difficult working conditions or work abuse (financial or physical).  
Because migrants listed different reasons for absconding, it was difficult to identify a 
dominant motive. To better understand the complexity of their motives, we ranked the categories 
in Table 8 by the severity of the reported reasons. In the financial column, we assume if a 
domestic worker has listed a financial reason among her lists, then financial reasons overcome 
all other reasons. For the same column, a physical reason is recorded, only if the domestic 
worker listed a physical abuse reason to abscond but at the same time did not mention a financial 
abuse irrespective of the other remaining reasons. For working conditions as reasons to be 
recorded, the domestic worker would have had to list it as a reason to abscond, while neither 
mentioning financial nor physical abuse reasons regardless of the other potential reasons. The 
same reasoning applies to the remaining columns. This ranking allows us to build a distribution 
15 
of reasons that add up to one within each ranking. The ranking is based on the assumption of the 
existence of contributing factors and a direct reason to the decision to abscond.9 Table 8 shows 
that almost 60 percent (59.9 percent) of our sample has listed financial abuse as one of the 
factors in their decision to leave the sponsor’s household. If we assume that physical abuse 
overcomes financial abuse, then one of every four domestic workers believes that physical abuse 
was the main trigger for their decision to leave. Together, financial and physical abuse form 77.8 
percent of our sample. Only 10.6 percent of domestic workers left their job for personal and 
other reasons.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 
[INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
 
[INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
 
[INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Finally, the survey asks absconding domestic workers whether they plan to return abroad 
for work. About 60.9 percent plan to migrate again for work in the future (Table 9). Half of the 
sample would consider going back to the GCC and a relatively smaller share (26.8 percent) of 
the sample sees the GCC as their next work destination. Other non-GCC destinations, which 
mainly include Asian countries, such as Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, were also identified 
as possible locations for future employment. Given that 77.8 percent of the sample (Table 8) 
experienced some type of abuse, we questioned the determinants of migrants' desire to return 
                                                 
9 We implicitly assume throughout that domestic workers rank reasons to abscond in terms of severity the following 
way: financial, physical, working conditions and other. We relax this assumption in the remaining columns in Table 
8 while still assuming that any type of abuse is worse than tough working conditions and personal reasons to 
abscond. This assumption is based on the qualitative dimension of the sample and also on our conversation with the 
absconding domestic workers during the data collection. We further list every ranking combination for all four 
absconding reasons in Table A1 in the appendix.   
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abroad and whether being abused or the type of abuse they experienced impacted their desire to 




 Table 10 presents the results from a Probit regression model that takes into consideration 
the binary nature of the dependent variable: one, if the domestic worker answered yes to the plan 
to return abroad for work after exiting Qatar and zero, otherwise. Table 10 also includes 
regressions that reflect six different rankings of the reasons to abscond. Since domestic workers 
have absconded due to a variety of reasons, it is difficult to identify the most salient reason 
prompting their decision to leave. To help us better understand their main motivation for leaving, 
we merge financial and physical reasons under abuse and keep working conditions and other 
reasons as separate. In Table 10, the first column, Ranking 1, ranks abuse first, working 
conditions second, and other reasons third. Ranking 2 ranks working conditions, abuse, and other 
reasons. Ranking 3 ranks other reasons, abuse, and working conditions. Ranking 4 ranks abuse, 
other reasons, and working conditions. Ranking 5 ranks working conditions, other, and abuse. 
Ranking 6 ranks other, working conditions, and abuse.10 The Probit model fits a regression of the 
likelihood to return abroad for work on a set of control variables from the survey. We control for 
age, education level, marital status, children status and previous work abroad experience for the 
domestic worker. We also include the cost of the visa and monthly salary as a way to proxy for 
the domestic workers’ financial capabilities. The regression includes two characteristics of the 
employer: whether the employer is from the GCC, the number of children living at the 
                                                 
10 The dependent variable is constructed from the answer to the following question: “Do you plan to work in other 
countries after exiting from Qatar?”  Therefore, the variable actually measures the intention for future migration to 
work for those in our sample. Often, absconding domestic workers from the Gulf are banned from the country where 
the immigration offense occurred. It is not clear if the ban is applicable to other GCC countries and whether workers 
will actually be able to come back to the Gulf. 
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employer’s household (we also square this to capture non-linearity in the effect of the size of the 
family). Lastly, we also include regional dummies to account for potential differences in the 
region of origin in the Philippines (local unemployment, poverty rates, size, location, etc.). The 
variable of interest is abuse, which takes on the value of one if the domestic worker has 
absconded due to financial or physical abuse rather than unfavorable working conditions or other 
(personal) issues.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The results suggest that age and last monthly salary have negative effects on the 
likelihood of returning abroad for all specifications (except Ranking 2 and Ranking 4 for salary). 
The marginal effects at the mean say that runaway domestic workers who are one year older are 
about 2.2 percent less likely to return abroad for work. A $100 USD increase in monthly salary 
lowers the likelihood of returning abroad by around 20 percent. Both results are reasonable given 
that domestic work is physically demanding and also given that salaries help workers meet debt 
needs while supporting their families back home.  If a domestic worker had a higher salary at the 
time they absconded, it is more likely that they have less debt or more savings and therefore are 
less motivated to return to Qatar to seek work.  
When migrants had work experience abroad previous to their employment when they 
absconded, there was an increase of about 28 percent that they would want to leave the 
Philippines. The level of education, marital status, and parental status did not seem to be 
associated with an increased likelihood that a migrant would want to return to work abroad. In 
terms of the migrants' personal determinants, only age, previous work abroad experience, and 
salary were linked to the decision to migrate again. 
18 
The number of children an employer has is actually linked to a higher likelihood of 
returning abroad. This is not surprising since domestic workers often form a special bond with 
the children of the employer, but more children also results in more work. We tested the 
connection between number of children and likelihood to return by including the squared value 
of the number of children. The coefficient on the squared variable is negative, highlighting the 
presence of non-linearity in the relationship between the likelihood of returning and the size of 
the family of the employer.  
The variable of interest is the reason for absconding. Abuse is a dummy that takes on the 
value of one if the runaway domestic worker has indicated financial or physical abuse as one of 
their reasons for absconding. Abuse takes on the value of zero if unfavorable working conditions 
or other reasons were behind the decision to leave their most recent employer. Being abused 
increases the probability of returning abroad for work by a range of 26 to 38 percent relative to 
leaving for personal problems. This effect of abuse is smaller (around 21 percent) relative to 
leaving for unfavorable working conditions. While this result initially seems counter intuitive, 
one could argue that domestic workers who have left due to abuse have had their trip to the 
Middle East unexpectedly cut short, for reasons that are not initiated by the worker. The 
coefficient on leaving for unfavorable working conditions is also positive and significant relative 
to leaving for personal reasons (the marginal effect ranges from 28 to 40 percent) depending on 
the ranking of the reasons to leave. When we ranked leaving for personal reasons as the main 
motivation behind absconding, (Rankings 5 and 6) the significance level of working conditions 
disappears. Table 10 suggests that domestic workers are more likely to want to migrate again if 
they have left their previous employer due to abuse or very hard working conditions than for 
personal reasons.  
19 
In the last Table, we disaggregate abuse into financial and physical abuse. Table 11 
presents the four different specifications. Each specification uses a dummy for the reason to 
abscond setting the dummy variable to 1 if the person listed that specific reason for leaving, 
otherwise the dummy is 0. The findings in Table 11 confirm the results of Table 10; abuse 
(whether financial or physical) is associated with about 13 (physical abuse) to 18 percent 
(financial abuse) increase in the likelihood of wanting to return relative to everything else. 
Unfavorable working conditions are associated with about 23 percent increase (relative to all 
other reasons) in the likelihood that a domestic worker will want to migrate again.11  
 






This paper examines the likelihood that absconding Filipina domestic workers in Qatar will 
migrate again for work after absconding and contributes to the literature on the determinants of 
migration and the debate on contract servitude in the GCC region by introducing empirical 
evidence on absconding domestic workers in Qatar. Using a unique dataset from the Philippine 
government’s POLO unit, we found that abuse (financial and physical) and unfavorable working 
conditions are positively related to wanting to migrate again relative to other reasons for 
absconding (transfer of employer, end of contract, or personal reasons such as pregnancy). In 
addition, absconding domestic workers who have been financially abused are more likely to 
return and seek employment abroad relative to those who have been physically abused. The 
empirical results provide perspective on the diverse types and effects of abuses on absconding 
                                                 
11 We also ran Probit regressions with each possible combination of ranking for reasons to abscond (24 in total) and 
the results are consistent. Abuse and bad working conditions are more likely to increase future migration relative to 
absconding due to personal reasons. The results are available from the authors upon request.  
20 
domestic work populations in Qatar and other GCC countries. Absconding domestic workers 
view financial abuse as the worst type of abuse because it directly prevents them from earning 
and supporting their family in the country of origin. Age and monthly salary variables are 
negatively associated with the likelihood of returning abroad for work, while previous 
experience working abroad increases the chances of future migration. The empirical findings 
have important policy implications as they shed light on a vulnerable migrant group that 
academic scholars, government and international organization policymakers have paid little 
attention to in recent decades in the Gulf region.12 The aforementioned empirical findings further 
suggest that abuse and poor working conditions do not deter workers from future migration and 
in fact be positively linked to future migration movements.  The willingness of workers to accept 
abuse shifts the bargaining power to destination countries and weakens the negotiating position 
of countries of origin in the international labor market.  
  
                                                 
12 Calzado (2007) acknowledges that the Philippine government has developed various protective mechanisms by 
imposing minimum wage laws in destination countries and bans on receiving governments that fail to comply with 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Absconding Domestic Workers’ Data Set 
Age Mean 32.5 Min 20 Max 50 
Monthly Salary ($) 
Mean 238.4 Min 137.4 Max 467.0 
       
Education Elementary 8.6% High School 66.9% College Level 24.5% 
Marital Status Single 38.4% Married 31.8% Separated 29.8% 
       
At least 1 Child 76.8% Previous Work Abroad 53.6% 
At least 2 Children 59.6% Mean # of Month if Work Abroad 26.4 
  Sample 302 
Notes: 1. Being separated also includes being divorced and widowed. 2. Data on the monthly salary in USD was 
calculated from Qatari Riyal (QAR) which has a fixed exchange rate to the US Dollar: 1 QAR is equal to 0.27 USD 











92% 94% 89% 88%
2010 2011 2012 2013
% of Total Runaways from the Philippines in GCC and MENA
% Runaways in GCC % of Runaways in MENA
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Table 2: Previous Work Experience (%) 
Previous Work Abroad Experience 53.6 
Multiple Country Work Abroad Experience  10.6 
Previous GCC Work Experience 37.4 
Previous Exclusive GCC Work Experience 31.8 
Previous non-GCC Work Experience 21.9 
Previous Exclusive non-GCC Work Experience 16.2 
 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of the Employer 
Country of Origin (%)   Education Level (%)    
 GCC  64.9  Worker Knows    62.6 
Non-GCC Arab  27.1      
South Asian  3.6      
Western  2.0  Employer’s Gender    
 Other  2.3  Female   24.8 




 3.1  % with 0 Children    16.2 
 0  % with 1 Child   4.6 
 7  % with more than 1 Child   79.1 
Notes: 1. While the GCC category includes all six countries of the Gulf region (Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates), almost all employers are from Qatar. 
Non-GCC Arab states include Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Palestine and Syria. Western 









Table 4: Migration Experience  
Why Work in Qatar (%)   Visa to Qatar (%)    
Support Family  77.2 Through Agency   95.7 
Pay Debt  30.1 Other   4.3 
Avoid Family Problems  16.0     
Professional Training  11.9  Mean Min Max 
   Visa Cost (USD) 266.5 23.6 942.3 
Notes: 1. Under visa to Qatar, other includes those who came to Qatar on a tourist/visit visa and those who were 
moved to Qatar through a direct hire.   
 
Table 5: Working Conditions   
Surrendered Passport (%)  89.1  Mean Min Max 
     Number of Working Hours 17.3 8 24 
     Have a Day Off (%)   2.9     
 
 
Table 6: Recorded Reasons to Absconding 
Financial Salary not paid, deduction in salary, and / or underpayment 59.9% 
Physical 




Long working hours, lack of medical assistance, lack of food, 
and / or job substitution (from the advertised) 77.8% 
Other 
Personal (getting pregnant, etc.), transfer of employer, 
nearing end of contract, or promise of higher salary (at a 








Table 7: Distribution of Reasons to Absconding (%) 
1 reason  2 reasons  3 reasons  4 reasons  
Financial 1.7 Financial / Physical 3.9 
Financial / 









Physical 2.0 Financial / Working Conditions 12.3 
Financial / 
Physical / Other 0.7   
        
Working 
Conditions 8.3 Financial / Other 2.3 
Financial / 
Working 
Conditions / Other 
8.6   
Other 10.6 Physical / Working Conditions 10.3 
Physical / Working 
Conditions / Other 4.6   
  Physical / Other 0.9     
  Working Conditions / Other 3.3     












Table 8: Ranking of Reasons to Abscond 









Financial 59.9 24.8 8.6 40.1 
77.8 
Physical 17.9 53.0 3.0 12.2 
Working Conditions 11.6 11.6 77.8 8.3 11.6 
Other 10.6 10.6 10.6 39.4 10.6 
Notes: The 1st is a ranking of the reason to abscond. In the first column for instance, if a domestic worker has listed 3 
different reasons which includes financial, then financial was assumed to be the decision trigger and therefore ranked 
1st, followed by physical, working conditions and other reasons. Abuse includes both financial and physical as one 
category. All percentages add to a 100.  
 
Table 9: Plans to Return  
 Plans to Return 
Abroad 60.9% 
Abroad including Gulf 50.0% 
Abroad to non-Gulf 34.1% 







Table 10: Determinants for Returning Abroad for Work 
 Ranking 1 Ranking 2 Ranking 3 Ranking 4 Ranking 5 Ranking 6 
Age -0.058*** -0.060*** -0.056*** -0.058*** -0.062*** -0.055*** 
 (0.0163) (0.0163) (0.0165) (0.0165) (0.0164) (0.0161) 
 [-0.022] [-0.023] [-0.021] [-0.022] [-0.023] [-0.020] 
College 0.162 0.149 0.120 0.137 0.123 0.131 
 (0.2091) (0.2096) (0.2085) (0.2086) (0.2084) (0.2077) 
 [0.062] [0.056] [0.045] [0.052] [0.046] [0.049] 
Single 0.094 0.072 0.117 0.125 0.044 0.096 
 (0.2158) (0.2157) (0.2181) (0.2152) (0.2186) (0.2136) 
 [0.035] [0.027] [0.044] [0.047] [0.016] [0.036] 
Child Dummy 0.226 0.212 0.260 0.259 0.223 0.238 
 (0.2341) (0.2377) (0.2341) (0.2332) (0.2400) (0.2330) 
 [0.085] [0.080] [0.098] [0.097] [0.084] [0.089] 
Previous Work Abroad 0.725*** 0.745*** 0.745*** 0.731*** 0.757*** 0.766*** 
 (0.1951) (0.1969) (0.1927) (0.1930) (0.1963) (0.1930) 
 [0.275] [0.281] [0.280] [0.276] [0.285] [0.288] 
Visa Cost 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
31 
Salary -0.005* -0.004 -0.006** -0.006** -0.004 -0.006** 
 (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0026) 
 [-0.002] [-0.002] [-0.002] [-0.002] [-0.001] [-0.002] 
GCC Employer 0.053 0.040 0.089 0.055 0.050 0.072 
 (0.1753) (0.1780) (0.1747) (0.1748) (0.1785) (0.1758) 
 [0.020] [0.015] [0.033] [0.020] [0.018] [0.027] 
Employer’s Children 0.664*** 0.674*** 0.737*** 0.688*** 0.690*** 0.751*** 
 (0.1379) (0.1367) (0.1339) (0.1370) (0.1362) (0.1330) 
 [0.252] [0.255] [0.277] [0.259] [0.260] [0.282] 
(Employer’s Children)2  -0.080*** -0.082*** -0.088*** -0.082*** -0.084*** -0.089*** 
 (0.0192) (0.0190) (0.0189) (0.0192) (0.0190) (0.0187) 
 [-0.030] [-0.031] [-0.033] [-0.031] [-0.031] [-0.035] 
Abuse  1.001*** 0.690* 0.569* 0.553* . . 
 (0.3189) (0.3934) (0.3178) (0.3066)   
 [0.379] [0.261] [0.214] [0.209]   
Working Conditions 0.737* 1.049*** . . 0.221 0.146 
 (0.3938) (0.3137)   (0.3327) (0.3450) 
 [0.279] [0.397]   [0.083] [0.054] 
       
       
32 
Other Reasons . . 0.326 -0.001 -0.672* -0.035 
   (0.3267) (0.3775) (0.3919) (0.3499) 
   [0.122] [-0.000] [-0.254] [-0.013] 
Constant 0.610 0.596 1.007 1.132 1.313 1.352 
 (0.8963) (0.8802) (0.8899) (0.9094) (0.9229) (0.8863) 
Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 302 302 302 302 302 302 
Notes: 1. Each ranking column determines the ranking of the first reason behind absconding. Ranking 1 ranks abuse first, working conditions second, and other 
reasons third. Ranking 2 ranks working conditions, abuse, and other reasons. Ranking 3 ranks other reasons, abuse, and working conditions. Ranking 4 ranks 
abuse, other reasons, and working conditions. Ranking 5 ranks working conditions, other, and abuse. Ranking 6 ranks other, working conditions, and abuse. The 
missing variable represents the category of reference. 2. Dependent variable is planning to return abroad for work regardless of the destination. 3. Coefficients are 






Table 11: Determinants of Returning Abroad for Work by Reason of Absconding 
 Financial Physical Working Conditions Other 
Reason to Abscond 0.479*** 0.351*** 0.608*** -0.163 
 (0.1798) (0.1677) (0.2118) (0.1703) 
 [0.181] [0.132] [0.228] [-0.061] 
     
Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 302 302 302 302 
Notes: 1. Coefficients are shown and robust standard errors are in parentheses. 2. Marginal effects in brackets are 
calculated at the mean. 3. The dependent variable is for returning abroad for work regardless of the destination. 4. In 
each column, the reason to abscond was set to 1 and all other reasons set to zero. 5. The regression also controls for 
age, education, marital status, child status, previous work experience, visa cost and monthly salary as in Table 10. 6. * 







Table A1: All Possible Ranking Combinations of Reasons to Abscond 
 1st 2nd  3rd  4th  
1 Financial Physical Working Conditions Other 
 59.9% 17.8% 11.6% 10.6% 
2 Financial Physical Other Working Conditions 
 59.9% 17.8% 13.9% 8.3% 
3 Financial Working Conditions Physical Other 
 59.9% 26.5% 2.9% 10.6% 
4 Financial Working Conditions Other Physical 
 59.9% 26.5% 11.6% 1.9% 
5 Financial Other Physical Working Conditions 
 59.9% 19.2% 12.2% 8.3% 
6 Financial Other Working Conditions Physical 
 59.9% 19.2% 18.5% 1.9% 
1 Physical Financial Working Conditions Other 
 52.9% 24.8% 11.6% 10.6% 
2 Physical Financial Other Working Conditions 
 52.9% 24.8% 13.9% 8.3% 
3 Physical Working Conditions Financial Other 
 52.9% 32.4% 3.9% 10.6% 
4 Physical Working Conditions Other Financial 
 52.9% 32.4% 12.9% 1.6% 
5 Physical Other Financial Working Conditions 
 52.9% 24.8% 13.9% 10.6% 
6 Physical Other Working Conditions Financial 
 52.9% 24.8% 20.5% 1.6% 
1 Working Conditions Financial Physical Other 
 77.8% 8.6% 2.9% 10.6% 
2 Working Conditions Financial Other Physical 
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 77.8% 8.6% 11.5% 1.9% 
3 Working Conditions Physical Financial Other 
 77.8% 7.6% 3.9% 10.6% 
4 Working Conditions Physical Other Financial 
 77.8% 7.6% 12.9% 1.6% 
5 Working Conditions Other Financial Physical 
 77.8% 14.5% 5.6% 1.9% 
6 Working Conditions Other Physical Financial 
 77.8% 14.5% 5.9% 1.6% 
1 Other Financial Physical Working Conditions 
 39.4% 40.1% 12.2% 8.3% 
2 Other Financial Working Conditions Physical 
 39.4% 40.1% 18.5% 1.9% 
3 Other Physical Financial Working Conditions 
 39.4% 38.4% 13.9% 8.3% 
4 Other Physical Working Conditions Financial 
 39.4% 38.4% 20.5% 1.6% 
5 Other Working Conditions Physical Financial 
 39.4% 52.9% 5.9% 1.6% 
6 Other Working Conditions Financial Physical 
 39.4% 52.9% 5.6% 1.9% 
 
